





BROADENING DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH: VOTING 
BEHAVIOR AND PANEL EFFECTS ON THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
Diane Hu* 
This Note seeks to determine the extent to which 
personal characteristics of judges—namely gender, race, and 
prior prosecutorial experience—affect individual judicial 
votes and panel decisions on the United States Courts of 
Appeals. Although these characteristics do not have a 
significant effect on the way an individual judge votes, this 
Note finds that the presence of one of these characteristics on 
a three-judge panel can influence how the other two judges 
vote, affecting the overall outcome.  
The presence of at least one female or black judge on a 
panel increases the likelihood of a more liberal decision 
across all cases. However, this effect disappears in cases that 
are specifically related to gender or race issues, such as 
employment discrimination cases. The presence of a prior 
prosecutor on a panel in criminal cases decreases the 
likelihood of a more liberal ruling (in favor of the defendant). 
These results shed light on the dynamics of panel decision-
making, and allow us to critically examine the federal 
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It is common knowledge that members of the 
executive and legislative branches of the United States 
government vote and craft policy according to their political 
beliefs. What is less apparent to the public but has been 
established through numerous studies is that judges’ voting 
behavior is also strongly correlated with their political 
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ideology.1 Recent studies have focused on whether judges’ 
other personal characteristics besides political affiliation, 
such as race and gender, have an effect on their voting 
behavior. Results have been mixed and incomprehensive, 
however. This Note will examine the relationships between 
judicial voting behavior and the attributes of race, gender, 
and prior prosecutorial experience on the United States 
Courts of Appeals. Amidst calls for greater diversity in the 
judicial branch to better reflect our nation’s people and their 
backgrounds, this Note supports the notion that a diverse 
bench can affect judicial outcomes and have tangible benefits 
on society. 
This Note tests quantitatively the hypotheses that 
race, gender, and prior prosecutorial experience affect judges’ 
individual votes as well as the two other judges’ votes on 
three-judge panels.2  Part I discusses the numerous benefits 
of judicial diversity and panel effects—that is, how one 
judge’s vote on a three-judge panel can affect other judges’ 
votes—on the United States Courts of Appeals.  It also 
identifies past empirical studies and how their methodologies 
have fallen short of painting a comprehensive picture of the 
effects of judges’ attributes.  Part II outlines this Note’s 
methodology of measuring both how personal characteristics 
affect judges’ individual votes and the votes of the other 
judges on the panel.  Part III summarizes the results and 
concludes that although race, gender, and prior prosecutorial 
experience may not affect judges’ individual votes, they do 
affect the other judges’ votes and thus the overall outcome.  
More specifically, the presence of a female or black judge 
increases the likelihood of what is coded as a more “liberal” 
                                                 
1 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS 7 (2007).  See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 1961–1964, 60 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
374, 380 (1966); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States 
Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 503–04 (1975). 
2 Although qualitative studies and interviews can tell us a great 
deal about how judges’ personal experiences and backgrounds have shaped 
the way they perceive the law, we can make greater general observations 
from a more comprehensive empirical study. “[A] broad examination of 
many cases can reveal a systematic pattern of decisions, and statistical 
analyses add rigor to claims of ideological bias.” Cross, supra note 1, at 14. 
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decision across all cases but not in gender- or race-specific 
cases, respectively.  Additionally, the presence of a prior 
prosecutor decreases the likelihood of a “liberal” decision 
(that is, one in favor of the defendant) in criminal cases.  
These significant results help legitimize calls for diversity on 
the bench and shed more light on the possible dynamics and 
thought processes on diverse three-judge panels.3 
 
II. HOW DIVERSITY AFFECTS VOTING OUTCOMES 
A. Diversity on the United States Courts of 
Appeals 
The concept of judicial diversity has expanded from 
political ideology and age to race, gender, and prior 
professional experiences—as well as numerous other 
attributes— since the increased diversification of the courts 
in the 1970s during the Carter Administration.4  In 
presidential administrations’ efforts to diversify the courts, 
women have made the greatest inroads compared to other 
political minorities.5  The movement to increase the 
proportion of female and minority judges on both state and 
federal courts has simultaneously brought about efforts to 
promote merit systems for judicial appointments instead of 
political elections.6  Calls for diversity in prior career 
experience have been less prominent, but are just as 
important for shaping a bench with a variety of perspectives. 
Even though some older studies have not found that 
more female or minority judges yield significant differences 
in judicial outcomes, the “inclusion of these groups is vital in 
maintaining and even increasing the legitimacy of the 
                                                 
3 Cross, supra note 1, at 70–71. 
4 Jason L. Morin, The Voting Behavior of Minority Judges in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals: Does the Race of the Claimant Matter?, 42 AM. POL. 
RES. 34, 35 (2013). 
5 Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities 
on State and Federal Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 
84, 92 (2001). 
6 Id. at 84. 
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nation’s judicial tribunals.”7  This symbolic significance of 
judicial diversity is part of the notion of “descriptive 
representation,” or the idea that elected officials should 
represent not only their constituencies but also their 
descriptive attributes, such as race or gender.8  A diverse 
courtroom is arguably vital for the symbolic representation 
as well, for the “intangible psychological benefits”9 induce 
more faith and confidence in the courts, thereby giving them 
more legitimacy.  These intangible benefits are accrued “in 
the aggregate, developed through judges’ interactions with 
one another and the public over time.”10 
Some empirical work has shown that “raising citizens’ 
level of legitimacy towards legal authorities . . . makes people 
more likely to obey the law,” so a diverse judiciary could 
potentially lead to a more law-abiding society.11  Even if 
more diverse benches do not decide cases differently, the 
public might feel a greater sense of justice and fairness by 
seeing their own backgrounds reflected in those who hold 
power in the courtroom.  Others suggest that diversifying 
courts could add new perspectives to important national 
discussions and perhaps provide remedial justice for past 
and continued inequalities.12  Thus, by “looking like 
America” and creating the perception of fairness, diverse 
courts can influence relevant policy outcomes, effect positive 
change, and bring about actual fairness.13  In contrast, 
                                                 
7 Id. at 85. 
8 Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal 
Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 
597 (2011). 
9 Morin, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
10 Joy Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity 
Improves Legal Decisions About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 
1209–10 (2006). 
11 Scherer, supra note 8, at 632. 
12 Morin, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
13 Josh Hsu, Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives, 
and Diversity on the Bench, 11 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 92, 115 (2006). In this 
qualitative study, Hsu examined the language in judges’ opinions and 
rationales, and found that background and personal experiences inform 
their interpretation of the law, especially in immigration deportation 
cases. Id. at 107–11. 
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“substantive representation” focuses more on the “decisional 
behavior of governmental officials and is therefore more 
policy oriented.”14  This Note’s empirical work ultimately 
examines the effects of substantive representation, as it 
looks at potential differences in case outcomes. 
 
B. Panel Effects on the United States Courts of 
Appeals 
This Note focuses exclusively on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, also known as the federal circuit courts.15  The lack 
of data and information on judicial decision-making on the 
appeals courts (in contrast to the Supreme Court) used to be 
a limiting factor.16  Though often overlooked, the circuit 
courts play an extremely important role in interpreting the 
law and influencing public policy, especially given the large 
number of cases they decide each year relative to the 
                                                                                                         
Thus, the public must advocate for diversity on the bench despite some 
studies’ inconclusive statistical results. Id. at 114. The key flaw with past 
empirical studies is that most only test to see if a single characteristic has 
an influential effect on judges’ decisions. Id. at 101. If studies can 
determine that judicial background is an important factor in case 
outcomes, the case for diversity on the bench would be even more 
convincing. Cross, supra note 1, at 75. 
14 Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial 
Diversity in American Courts, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 153, 159 (2004). 
15 There are 94 federal judicial districts, with at least one district 
in each state as well as one in the District of Columbia and one in Puerto 
Rico. These districts are organized into one of 12 regional circuits, and 
with the addition of the Federal Circuit—which has nationwide 
jurisdiction—they make up a total of 13 United States courts of appeals. 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_of_appeals.html 
[https://perma.cc/MH2H-WRBA](last visited May 21, 2018). Each court of 
appeals hears and decides appeals from the district court situated within 
its circuit, and has at least three assigned judgeships. Each circuit has 
between six and twenty-eight judges. Id. 
16 Tracey E. George & Reginald S. Sheehan, Circuit Breaker: 
Deciphering Courts of Appeals Decisions Using the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Data Base, 83 JUDICATURE 240, 245 (2000). 
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Supreme Court.17  Furthermore, the Supreme Court rarely 
reviews the outcomes of lower federal courts, so these 
decisions are final. Thus, the appeals courts play a large role 
in settling disputes and determining the “likely direction of 
the law.”18  Since these circuit courts are often the “last 
resort” for a substantial number of major legal issues,19 it is 
vital that we continue to study the possible determinants of 
the courts’ decisions. 
When a party appeals a lower district court decision, 
a panel of three judges either affirms or reverses the 
decision.20  Some cases are decided en banc, meaning the 
case is heard before all of the judges on the bench.  However, 
in order to examine panel effects and any existing influence 
that one judge may have over others, this Note will focus 
solely on cases decided by three-judge panels. 
Because appeals court judges are not only swayed by 
their own legal views but also by those of their colleagues on 
the panel, the composition of a panel has great potential to 
                                                 
17 Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior 
and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1993). 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals were established by the Judiciary Act of 1891, 
which is also known as the Evarts Act. They were the first federal courts 
designed for the sole purpose of hearing cases on appeal from trial courts. 
This significantly lightened the Supreme Court’s caseload and eliminated 
the need for U.S. circuit courts, the original intermediate level courts that 
had both trial court jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction over the district 
courts. From then on, justices no longer ruled on appeals of cases that they 
had seen earlier in trial courts. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, LANDMARK 
LEGISLATION: U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-judicial-legislation-text-
document-10 (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). However, it was not until the 
Judiciary Act of 1925 that the federal circuit courts’ power expanded, for 
this act gave the Supreme Court more discretionary control over its docket, 
which in turn increased the appellate docket. George & Sheehan, supra 
note 16, at 240–241. The larger docket gave the federal circuit courts more 
responsibility and lawmaking ability in deciding every single case properly 
appealed to them. Id. 
18 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES 
SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 3 (2006). 
19 Frank B. Cross, Comparative Judicial Databases, 83 
JUDICATURE 248, 248 (2000). 
20 Cross, supra note 1, at 1. 
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change the case outcome.  Each circuit of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals has an official system of randomly assigning judges 
to case panels.  This method of neutral assignment should 
prevent judges from being able to select which cases they feel 
most strongly about, which supposedly “increases the 
legitimacy of judicial decision making.”21  However, this may 
also produce unbalanced panels that are more likely to vote a 
particular way, especially if the issue is ideologically 
contested.  As a result, some final panel decisions might 
reflect partisan interests,22 which is problematic on a branch 
whose decisions should not be determined by politics.  One 
study found that Republican judges were more likely to vote 
more liberally when sitting with two Democratic judges than 
when sitting with at least one other Republican.23  This Note 
looks for similar effects with other characteristics like the 
presence of females and racial minorities. 
According to some scholars, the traditional model of 
judicial decision-making abides by the “median voter 
theorem,”24 in which each judge votes according to his own 
preference, and the judge with the median preference 
prevails.  However, with panel effects, it is likely that judges 
can influence others, be influenced by others, and change 
their minds, as “differing ideological and background 
characteristics of a single panel member can affect the 
group’s decision.”25  Research has shown that circuit court 
judges are influenced by others, and that this “collegiality 
effect” is at least as strong as a single judge’s own choices.26  
As a result, some use the notion of panel effects to argue that 
circuit courts should have a minimum number of women and 
                                                 
21 Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Over Time, 64 POL. RES. Q. 377, 379 (2011). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. This effect is called ideological dampening. Sunstein, supra 
note 18, at 9. Conversely, when a judge votes in extreme ways when sitting 
on a panel with other judges of the same party, it is called ideological 
amplification or group polarization. Id. 
24 Cross, supra note 1, at 148. 
25 Id. at 177. 
26 Id. at 9. 
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racial minority judges for the effect they may have on the 
decision-making process.27  
 
C. Empirical Studies of Voting Behavior 
Some of the first studies that examined U.S. Courts of 
Appeals judges’ characteristics and voting behavior were 
done in the 1960s.  In his first study, Goldman only found 
evidence of a relationship between party affiliation and 
voting patterns on the appeals courts from 1961 through 
1964.28  Other demographic variables tested included 
religious affiliation, place of birth, undergraduate and law 
school institutions attended, and past federal experience,29 
none of which were found to have an effect on the way judges 
voted. Goldman’s first study did not test for race or gender. 
Goldman’s second study again found that party affiliation 
had the strongest direct link to voting behavior.30  Since 
then, studies have consistently found that party affiliation or 
political ideology has a statistically significant effect on 
judicial decisions.31 
Several studies on the role of race and gender on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals have since been undertaken, and 
results have been inconsistent.  For the most part, scholars 
find that background factors like race, gender, and past 
career experience have little impact on judicial outcomes.32  
Some have found differences in race while others have not.33  
                                                 
27 Id. at 168. 
28 Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts 
of Appeals, 1961–1964, 60 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374, 380 (1966). 
29 Id. at 382. 
30 Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts 
of Appeals Revisited, 69 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 503–04 (1975). 
Goldman coded judicial decisions on a scale of 0 to 2 of liberalness; the 
higher the number, the more liberal the decision. Id. at 492–93. “This is by 
now a convention of judicial research on lower courts.” Id. This Note uses a 
similar scale from 1 to 3. 
31 Cross, supra note 1, at 7. These results support the notion of 
legal realism, a movement among legal academics about the political 
nature of judicial decision-making. Id. at 11. 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 Id. at 73. 
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There have yet to be any definitive conclusions, but it is 
undeniable that these factors play a role in forming people’s 
perspectives on critical issues. 
The growing number of women and racial and ethnic 
minorities on the federal courts has allowed other scholars to 
conduct similar studies that focus on either race or gender, or 
both.  A recent 2013 paper examined employment 
discrimination claims between 2001 and 2009 on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals and found that minority judge voting 
behavior varied by ethnicity; namely, while African 
American judges were more likely to vote in favor of black 
claimants, Latino judges were less likely to vote in favor of 
claimants in general.34  However, because these studies 
tested across all cases and focused primarily on the litigants’ 
characteristics rather than on the judges’ characteristics, our 
understanding of race and voting behavior is still not fully 
established.  
Conclusions on gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
are, again, quite varied and conflicting; some say female 
judges are more liberal than their male counterparts, while 
other empirical studies claim that there are no significant 
gender differences.35  One study examined gender and race 
but incorporated and advocated for a different approach that 
focused on the interaction of different individual 
characteristics in criminal cases, a method that this Note 
                                                 
34 Morin, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
35 See, e.g., Davis et al., supra note 17, at 131–32 (analyzing 
voting behavior in three areas of employment discrimination and finding 
that the voting of female judges differed significantly from that of male 
judges in employment discrimination and criminal search and seizure 
cases, but not in obscenity cases). The same three scholars expanded on 
this in a second study, which reconfirmed that employment discrimination 
cases showed significant discrepancies. Donald R. Songer, Sue Davis & 
Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: 
Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 425 (1994). The 
study also acknowledged the problem with examining only “three narrowly 
defined issue areas,” and that further research into other area topics is 
needed, especially because women and minority judges are still relatively 
new to the legal system. Id. at 437. This Note will endeavor to expand the 
range of topics in the author’s study by incorporating over 50 types of cases 
in hopes that this will yield different results. 
No. 3:341]          BROADENING DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH 351 
 
incorporates.36  Mixed findings in the past have soundly 
indicated that judges are not influenced by just one attribute 
but rather “by a host of personal traits that collectively 
impact their behaviors.”37  The joint effects of race and 
gender were shown through the finding that minority female 
judges were more likely to vote in ways that supported 
criminal defendants even after controlling for other factors 
like region, ideology, and age.38  
Overall, past studies show that we must alter our 
methods in understanding judicial voting behavior.  This 
includes examining overlapping characteristics instead of 
individual ones39 and examining panel effects rather than 
individual judicial votes, which is what this Note does.40  
Additionally, most studies of panel composition that have 
been undertaken have focused on a narrow time period, 
focusing heavily on the past couple decades,41 and tend to 
focus on only one or two legal issues, “mak[ing] generalizing 
                                                 
36 Todd Collins & Laura Moyer, Gender, Race, and 
Intersectionality on the Federal Appellate Bench, 61 POL. RES. Q. 219, 221 
(2007). 
37 Id. at 219. 
38 Id. at 222, 224. 
39 Id. at 225. 
40 Kastellec suggests that because of the low percentage of female 
and minority federal judges, it would be best to stop studying whether 
minority judges vote differently from nonminority judges, but rather 
whether the presence of females or racial minorities on appeals courts 
influences outcomes and other judges. This new approach is more suitable 
to the structure of the appeals courts. Kastellec, supra note 21. He 
discusses the phenomenon in which panel composition affects individual 
judicial decisions and as a result, the final decisions of three-judge panels. 
Id. at 377. Most studies described above treat each judge as an individual 
acting of his own volition. Cross, supra note 1, at 148. This would be 
accurate if we were looking at lone trial judges in the federal district 
courts, but it disregards the institutional structure of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, where decisions are made by majority vote on three-judge panels. 
Focusing on individual judicial decisions thus yields a problematic 
research design that may explain the inconclusive results from past 
studies. Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision 
Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 327 (2004). 
41 Kastellec, supra note 21, at 380. 
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beyond specific issues difficult.”42  This Note uses data that 
includes information dating back to the 1920s.  In his book, 
Cross stated that one might expect to see a greater gender 
panel effect if the data were further broken down into 




This two-part study first examines how 
characteristics affect an individual judge’s voting behavior 
and then how that individual judge’s characteristics affect 
the voting behavior of the other judges on the panel.  Within 
each test, this Note will see if the results change for specific 
related types of cases, and how the characteristics affect 
outcomes across all cases.44  Because this study looks at 
                                                 
42 Id. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and 
Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 167 (2013) 
(finding that the presence of one black judge on a panel of three greatly 
increased the likelihood that the final ruling favored affirmative action 
programs); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and 
Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 
1759, 1761 (2005) (examining the presence of female appellate judges on a 
panel across just three years and finding that plaintiffs were twice as 
likely to be successful in sexual harassment or sex discrimination cases 
when a female judge served on the panel). Thus, both blacks and females 
are able to influence their white or male colleagues in particular types of 
cases. 
43 Cross, supra note 1, at 170. 
44 This Note uses three datasets in this study. The first is the 
original comprehensive multi-user appeals court database created by Dr. 
Donald Songer, with a sample of cases from each circuit for each year from 
1925 to 1996. Drs. Ashlyn Kuersten and Susan Haire (Kuersten and 
Haire, 2007) then created an updated dataset, coding the cases from 1997 
to 2002 in a similar fashion. This Note merged both of these datasets with 
a third dataset compiled by Drs. Gary Zuk, Deborah Barrow, and Gerard 
Gryski (Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski, 2009) with information on the political, 
career, and economic attributes of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges from 1801 
to 2000 (and limited information on judges through 2004), making sure 
that the identifying numerical codes for the judges matched across all 
datasets. 
The variables in the Songer Database on appeals court cases are 
divided into four categories: basic case characteristics, participant 
No. 3:341]          BROADENING DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH 353 
 
panel effects, only cases whose method of decision was by a 
three-judge panel (as opposed to en banc decisions made by 
all of the judges on the circuit) were included. 
There are 220 specific categories of cases. For each 
case, the directionality of the court’s decision has been 
determined on a liberalness scale of 1 to 3.  The higher the 
number, the more liberal the decision.  For example, 
decisions in favor of criminal defendants, racial minorities in 
civil rights claims, labor unions, injured workers, and parties 
seeking protection from the First Amendment are coded as 
liberal (“3”).  This method of coding “liberalness” is used in 
public law literature and is similar to how decisions were 
recorded in the Dr. Harold Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court 
database.45  It is also “now a convention of judicial research 
on lower courts.”46  Because this coding only captures the 
final vote, however, it is difficult to capture all the details 
and nuances from the discussions, opinion, and particular 
facts of each case.47  
                                                                                                         
characteristics, issues, and judges’ characteristics and votes. Basic case 
characteristics consist of general case information, such as docket number, 
decision date, length of opinion, procedural history, circuit, state, district, 
and method of decision. 
The participant variables give detailed information on the 
litigants of the case. First, the number of appellants and appellees are 
given, and then the first two appellants and appellees are each given a 
five-digit code based on their nature (e.g. business, nonprofit organization, 
federal government, state government, or natural person). Each general 
category is broken down into more specific categories. The database also 
matches the appellant and appellee to the plaintiff and defendant. Issue 
variables are first divided into eight general categories: criminal, civil 
rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, labor relations, economic 
activity and regulation, and miscellaneous. 
Finally, the judges and votes variables denote the identifying 
codes for each judge and his or her vote on each case for up to 15 judges. Of 
course, for this study, we will only look at cases with three judges on the 
panel. 
45 Donald R. Songer, United States Courts of Appeals Database 
Phase 1, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
RESEARCH, http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm. 
46 Goldman, supra note 30, at 492–93. 
47 There are, of course, issues with “translating something so 
amorphous as ideology into a numerical measure for quantitative 
analysis.” Cross, supra note 1, at 20. However, this most common method 
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Prior prosecutorial experience was defined as any 
past experience as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. 
Attorney, special prosecutor, state prosecutor, District 
Attorney, County Attorney, City Attorney, deputy or 
assistant district attorney, deputy or assistant county 
attorney, or deputy or assistant city attorney.48 
                                                                                                         
of coding is still more detailed, manageable, and ideal than other possible 
options. A binary variable that only accounts for liberal or not liberal 
might simplify tests, but it also would have ignored even more nuance in 
case decisions. Switching to a scale of, say, 1 to 5 in order to better account 
for this nuance might then be deemed too arbitrary and would be up for 
debate amongst legal scholars when analyzing case outcomes. Therefore, 
the tried-and-true scale of 1 to 3 might be the best way to carry out a 
quantitative study of legal cases. 
48 The attributes dataset contains information on the judges’ race, 
gender, religion, political party affiliation, appointing president, education, 
net worth, age, date of appointment and departure, American Bar 
Association rating, and prior federal experience. 
To incorporate this information with the Songer Database and 
match the different judge IDs, the author first created a new “judge vote” 
variable and three copies of the Songer data. After making sure that each 
copy of the data included the judge vote for the first judge, second judge, 
and third judge, respectively, the author combined all three copies of the 
data together.  
In order to make the process of testing panel characteristics 
manageable, this Note recoded the three main attributes of interest as 
binary variables. Gender was already a binary variable (though the author 
did change “1” for male and “2” for female into “0” for male and “1” for 
female). There were five options for race in the attributes dataset, but it 
made more sense to include only two binary variables due to the extremely 
low number of cases with Asian American or Native American judges. As 
said, one variable is for black and one is for white, leaving Hispanics as 
the reference category. 
After defining these binary variables for individual judge 
characteristics, the author then created variables for panel characteristics. 
Rather than coding these as binary as well—such as whether or not a 
female, minority, or past prosecutor was on the panel—I decided to 
designate panel characteristics as the total number of females, minorities, 
or past prosecutors on the panel per case, ranging from 0 to 2. This way, 
this Note will be able to see if there are any significant differences between 
having, say, one female on the panel versus two or three. The “2” category 
encompasses panels with either two or three judges that fit the 
characteristic, as the number of panels with three judges of each 
characteristic is very low, except for the more common characteristics like 
White. 
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This Note grouped together particular case types as 
defined in the original database into three larger case 
categories for the study: gender, race, and prosecution cases.  
This created a larger pool of cases that past studies lacked.  
After cases that were decided en banc and not on a three-
judge panel have been removed, there were a total of 40,523 
observations.  Any case type or issue that this Note deemed 
directly relevant to each independent variable was included.  
They span across several of the dataset’s general categories, 
from First Amendment to privacy issues.  
The gender cases are employment sex discrimination, 
pregnancy discrimination, other sex discrimination, abortion 
rights, contraception, and other privacy claims related to 
marital relations or sexual behavior.  There are a total of 414 
cases that fall into these categories and are thus designated 
as “gender cases.” 
Race cases encompassed voting rights (including race 
discrimination in voting), desegregation, employment race 
discrimination, other race discrimination, and the legality of 
expression through overt acts (such as speeches and 
picketing) specifically protesting race discrimination.  There 
are 807 race cases total.  
Categorizing prosecution cases was the most 
straightforward of the three types.  This Note includes all 
criminal cases (both federal and state offenses): murder, 
rape, arson, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, auto 
theft, larceny, other violent crimes, narcotics, alcohol related 
crimes, tax fraud, firearm violations, morals charges, 
criminal violations of government regulations of business, 
and other white collar crimes.  There are 14,884 criminal 
cases in the dataset. 
The focus on appeals courts not only makes up for a 
missing component of the literature, but also gives the study 
consistency, which can make the statistical analysis and 
results more reliable.  For example, because all cases are 
federal, the procedures in court are largely the same across 
all circuits.  Additionally, the method of voting on panels of 
three judges and the uniform appointment system are 
similar.  (Although there are of course substantive 
differences and circuit splits on certain areas of the law, 
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these regional differences are controlled for in the model.)  
The large size of the database and the fact that there are 
three judges per case in the appellate courts give us a great 
deal of information and observations, which increases 
reliability.  Finally, because the U.S. Courts of Appeals do 
not have the discretion to decide which cases to take on 
(unlike the Supreme Court), there is less of a concern for 
selection bias. 
 
B. Research Design 
This Note focuses on race and gender because they 
are significant traits that can shape one’s thoughts, 
preferences, and beliefs.  This Note also explores whether a 
judge has had prior prosecutorial experience in criminal 
cases because this experience can significantly alter the way 
one views the criminal justice system.49  The first test 
focuses on judges’ individual votes, with the dependent 
variable as the directionality of each judge’s vote on a 1 to 3 
scale of “liberalness,” with three ordered categories: “liberal,” 
“mixed,” or “conservative.”  For the second test for panel 
effects, the dependent variable is also from 1 to 3, but only 
accounts for the directionality of the final panel decision 
(rather than the vote of each individual judge).50  The 
equations are as follows:51 
 
1. Individual Judicial Vote 
 
= B0 + B1Female + B2White + B3Black + 
B4Pros + B5GenderCase + B6RaceCase + 
B7ProsCase + B8GenderCase*Female + 
                                                 
49 Goldman did not find that prior federal experience as a judge, 
public office candidate, or public prosecutor mattered. Goldman, supra 
note 30, at 499–500. This Note tests this trait for criminal cases only. 
50 Because the dependent variable in this study is ordinal (on a 
scale of 1 to 3), the author ran ordinal logistic regressions in Stata and 
included a number of other independent and control variables as shown in 
the two models above. 
51 Please refer to Table 1 for definitions of the abbreviated 
variables in the two models. 
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B9RaceCase*White + B10RaceCase*Black + 
B11ProsCase*Pros + B12FemalePanel + 
B13WhitePanel + B14BlackPanel + 
B15HispanicPanel + B16ProsPanel + 
B17AppelFemale + B18AppelMinority + 
B19RespondFemale + B20RespondMinority + 
B21Party + B22PresParty + B23Age + 
B24GradDeg1 + B25GradDeg2 + B26Decade40 + 
B27Decade50 + B28Decade60 + B29Decade70 + 
B30Decade80 + B31Decade90 + B32Circuit0 + 
B33Circuit1 + B34Circuit2 + B35Circuit3 + 
B36Circuit4 + B37Circuit5 + B38Circuit6 + 
B39Circuit7 + B40Circuit8 + B41Circuit9 + 
B42Circuit10 
 
2. Panel Decision 
 
= B0 + B1FemalePanel + B2WhitePanel + 
B3BlackPanel +B4HispanicPanel + 
B5ProsPanel + B6GenderCase + 





B13ProsCas*ProsPanel + B14AppelFemale + 
B15AppelMinority + B16RespondFemale + 
B17RespondMinority + B18Party + 
B19PresParty + B20Age + B21GradDeg1 + 
B22GradDeg2 + B23Decade40 + B24Decade50 
+ B25Decade60 + B26Decade70 + B27Decade80 
+ B28Decade90 + B29Circuit0 + B30Circuit1 + 
B31Circuit2 + B32Circuit3 + B33Circuit4 + 
B34Circuit5 + B35Circuit6 + B36Circuit7 + 
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Table 1. Description of Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
Variable Name Definition and Coding 
JudgeVote Directionality of individual judge’s 
vote (scale of 1 to 3) 
PanelDecision Directionality of case outcome (scale of 
1 to 3) 
Female 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
White 1 if white, 0 otherwise 
Black 1 if black, 0 otherwise 
Pros 1 if has prior prosecutorial experience, 
0 otherwise 
GenderCase 1 if case is gender-related, 0 otherwise 
RaceCase 1 if case is race-related, 0 otherwise 
ProsCase 1 if case is a criminal case, 0 otherwise 
FemalePanel Number of females on panel (0, 1, or 
2+) 
WhitePanel Number of whites on panel (0, 1, or 2+) 
BlackPanel Number of blacks on panel (0, 1, or 2+) 
HispanicPanel Number of Hispanics on panel (0, 1, or 
2+) 
ProsPanel Number of past prosecutors on panel 
(0, 1, or 2+) 
AppelFemale Appellant’s gender (1 if female, 0 
otherwise) 
AppelMinority Appellant’s race (1 if minority, 0 
otherwise) 
RespondFemale Respondent’s gender (1 if female, 0 
otherwise) 
RespondMinority Respondent’s race (1 if minority, 0 
otherwise) 
Party Party affiliation of judge (1 if 
Democrat, 0 otherwise) 
PresParty Party of appointing president (1 if 
Democrat, 0 otherwise) 
Age Age of judge at the time of decision 
GradDeg1 First graduate degree (other than J.D.) 
attained 
No. 3:341]          BROADENING DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH 359 
 
GradDeg2 Second graduate degree (other than 
J.D.) attained 
Decade40 1 if case occurred in the 1940s, 0 
otherwise 
Decade50 1 if case occurred in the 1950s, 0 
otherwise 
Decade60 1 if case occurred in the 1960s, 0 
otherwise 
Decade70 1 if case occurred in the 1970s, 0 
otherwise 
Decade80 1 if case occurred in the 1980s, 0 
otherwise 
Decade90 1 if case occurred in the 1990s, 0 
otherwise 
Circuit0 1 if case occurred in the D.C. Circuit, 0 
otherwise 
Circuit1 1 if case occurred in the First Circuit, 0 
otherwise 
Circuit2 1 if case occurred in the Second 
Circuit, 0 otherwise 
Circuit3 1 if case occurred in the Third Circuit, 
0 otherwise 
Circuit4 1 if case occurred in the Fourth Circuit, 
0 otherwise 
Circuit5 1 if case occurred in the Fifth Circuit, 0 
otherwise 
Circuit6 1 if case occurred in the Sixth Circuit, 0 
otherwise 
Circuit7 1 if case occurred in the Seventh 
Circuit, 0 otherwise 
Circuit8 1 if case occurred in the Eighth Circuit, 
0 otherwise 
Circuit9 1 if case occurred in the Ninth Circuit, 
0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Proportion 
of 0 (%) 
Proportion 
of 1 (%) 
Proportion 
of 2+ (%) 
Female 95.13 4.87  
White 94.96 5.04  
Black 96.58 3.42  
Pros 64.71 35.29  
GenderCase 99.08 0.92  
RaceCase 98.21 1.79  
ProsCase 66.99 33.01  
FemalePanel 88.13 10.73 1.13 
WhitePanel 0.16 4.0 95.85 
BlackPanel 90.91 8.75 0.34 
HispanicPanel 95.95 3.90 0.16 
ProsPanel 28.55 47.75 23.70 
AppelFemale 92.96 7.04  
AppelMinority 95.10 4.90  
RespondFemale 97.33 2.67  
RespondMinority 99.01 0.99  
Party 50.04 49.96  
PresParty 50.83 49.17  
GradDeg1 84.71 15.29  
GradDeg2 98.85 1.15  
Decade40 91.06 8.94  
Decade50 91.36 8.64  
Decade60 83.17 16.83  
Decade70 82.52 17.48  
Decade80 82.79 17.21  
Decade90 78.18 21.82  
Circuit0 90.50 9.50  
Circuit1 90.69 9.31  
Circuit2 90.47 9.53  
Circuit3 91.38 8.62  
Circuit4 91.37 8.63  
Circuit5 90.67 9.33  
Circuit6 90.97 9.03  
Circuit7 90.62 9.38  
Circuit8 91.35 8.65  
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Circuit9 91.41 8.59  
Circuit10 91.70 8.30  
 
 
As can be seen in Table 1 and the equations above, 
the key independent variables for gender, race, and prior 
prosecutorial experience are bolded.  In this model, the 
author created two binary variables for race (black and 
white) in order, leaving Hispanics as the reference category.  
While the original dataset used for this Note also coded for 
Asian Americans and Native Americans, there was only one 
Asian American and there were no Native Americans, so 
those two options were not included in the model. 
For individual judicial vote, the key independent 
variables are Female, White, Black, and Pros.  For panel 
decision, the bolded variables are the panel characteristics 
FemalePanel, WhitePanel, BlackPanel, HispanicPanel, and 
ProsPanel, each of which is the number of females, whites, 
blacks, Hispanics, or past prosecutors on a given panel (up to 
two), respectively. 
The next few variables in each model are the 
characteristics of the cases in question.52  If the appellant or 
appellee is a natural person (as opposed to a business or the 
government), the model will include that individual’s race 
and gender.  Of course, gender, race, and prior career 
experience are not the only significant characteristics that 
influence judges’ preferences.  This Note thus includes other 
attributes that are relevant to judges’ personal backgrounds 
and may influence the judges’ votes as control variables, 
namely party affiliation, party of appointing president, age, 
and any graduate degree education other than a Juris 
Doctor.53  The variables that follow in the models are dummy 
                                                 
52 The variables Hispanic, GradDeg3 (third graduate degree), 
Decade30 (the 1930s), and Circuit11 (Eleventh Circuit) are not included in 
the model or Table 1 to avoid collinearity. 
53 Because the original datasets the author worked with 
accounted for many details, many variables of interest like the race and 
gender of the appellants and appellees are categorical over five groups. In 
order for these variables to work with this Notes ordinal logit, the author 
adjusted their coding to binary. This Note repeated this process for some of 
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variables for circuit and decade in order to evaluate any 
changes over time or across region and circuit.54  
Finally, this Note uses interaction terms created by 
the author to capture interaction effects between the 
attributes and their corresponding case types.  These 
interaction effects allow the author to examine individual or 
gender effects with cases deemed relevant to gender, race 
effects with cases deemed relevant to race, and so on.55  For 
past prosecutorial experience, this Note looks at all criminal 
                                                                                                         
the judges’ other characteristics as well, namely party affiliation, party of 
appointing president, age, and education. Age is the only one of this Note’s 
control variables that is not binary. The minimum age in the dataset is 25, 
the mean is 52, and the maximum is 71. 
54 This Note determined the sampling weights according to 
instructions in the Songer Database codebook. Because the total number of 
cases varies per circuit per year—in some years 15 cases were selected per 
year while in others 30 cases were selected per year—the total sample of 
cases is not a random sample of all appeals court decisions. Thus, using a 
provided table of weights, this Note calculated a sampling weight for each 
circuit per year, which was then attached to each case. Each sampling 
weight was determined by dividing the number of cases per circuit in a 
given year by the total number of cases across all circuits in that year. 
55 The gender interaction term is the product of two binary 
variables: whether it is a gender case, and whether the judge is female. 
This Note will then be able to evaluate how both males and females vote in 
gender cases versus non-gender cases. In the second test, the interaction 
term is the product of one binary and one continuous variable: whether it 
is a gender case, and the number of females (up to two). Thus, the first 
factor is binary, and the options for the second factor are 0, 1, and 2, with 
two encompassing panels of two or more females. This will provide 
information on how the presence of females (or lack thereof) affects gender 
cases as well as non-gender cases. The other interaction terms are 
calculated in the same way, but instead of the number of females, it is the 
number of blacks, whites, and past prosecutors (but again, up to two). 
The reason this Note models interaction effects this way is 
because if it were a simple count of the number of females up to three, 
there would not be enough variability due to the small number of cases 
with panels of three females. A simple run of the ordinal logistic regression 
and marginal effects illustrated that this greatly skewed the results. For 
example, there are only 12 out of tens of thousands of observations that 
have three blacks on one panel; this accounts for less than one percent of 
all cases. While this was not an issue for whites, this Note coded all three 
attribute panel variables as either 0, 1, or 2, with two representing cases 
with either two or three females, blacks, whites, or past prosecutors for the 
sake of consistency. 
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cases and no civil cases.  Different types of cases have 
different levels of importance when examining background 
characteristics; for example, a boundary dispute between two 
states would not be as relevant as, say, First Amendment or 
labor relations issues.56  The type of case may be even more 
important than the judge’s ideology to the direction of case 
outcomes.57  Most studies in the literature either examine 
too broad a range of cases (all of them) or too specific a range; 
this Note attempts to modify and correct this.  
 
C. Hypotheses 
This Note hypothesizes that each of the three 
attributes will influence the directionality of individual 
judges’ votes on cases that are relevant to each particular 
characteristic.  This Note also hypothesizes that when there 
is at least one female or minority in the panel in a gender- or 
race-related case, respectively, there will be a stronger 
relationship between the panel characteristics and the 
directionality of the panel’s final decision.  
Both females and racial minorities bring an important 
perspective to the bench and think about relevant issues 
differently from other appeals court judges.  Their presence 
on the bench may make other judges on the panel more 
aware of gender or race issues.  They may also be able to 
persuade their colleagues to support a particular litigant. 
This Note thus hypothesize that females are more likely to 
vote liberally in gender-related cases, as are blacks and 
Hispanics in race-related cases.  Even if the individual votes 
of females, blacks, and Hispanics may not change 
substantially, this Note hypothesizes that their presence on 
panels may influence their white male colleagues and 
increase the probability of an ultimately more liberal 
outcome.  Finally, this Note predicts that judges with past 
prosecutorial experience will be more stringent on 
defendants and will thus vote more conservatively, since a 
liberal decision is coded as one that supports the position of 
                                                 
56 Cross, supra note 1, at 25. 
57 Id. 
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the defendant in a criminal procedure case.  This Note also 
hypothesizes that there will be panel effects for prosecutorial 
experience, for even if past professions are not as observable 
or prominent as features like race and gender, judges can 
still influence others during deliberations.  
 
Table 3. Hypotheses 
Individual Judicial Vote  
Gender Female judges will vote in a more 
liberal manner in gender cases. 
Race Black and Hispanic judges will vote 




Judges with prosecutorial 
experience will vote in a less liberal 
manner in criminal cases. 
 
Panel Decision  
Gender The presence of at least one female 
judge on the panel will result in a 
more liberal outcome in gender 
cases. 
Race The presence of at least one black or 
Hispanic judge on the panel will 




The presence of at least one judge 
with prosecutorial experience on the 
panel will result in a less liberal 
outcome in criminal cases. 
 




1. Individual Judicial Vote 
Table 4. Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for 
Individual Judicial Vote 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Logit coefficient Odds 
ratio 
   
GenderCase 0.105 1.110 
 (0.100) (0.111) 
Female -0.0396 0.961 
 (0.0816) (0.0784) 
GenderCase*Female -0.0713 0.931 
 (0.359) (0.335) 
RaceCase -0.0696 0.933 
 (0.688) (0.641) 
White 0.0510 1.052 
 (0.129) (0.136) 
RaceCase*White 0.101 1.107 
 (0.692) (0.766) 
Black 0.0651 1.067 
 (0.152) (0.162) 
RaceCase*Black -0.152 0.859 
 (0.833) (0.715) 
ProsCase -1.166*** 0.312**
* 
 (0.0328) (0.0102) 
Pros 0.0126 1.013 
 (0.0325) (0.0329) 
ProsCase*Pros -0.0185 0.982 
 (0.0547) (0.0537) 
FemalePanel 0.118** 1.125** 
 (0.0496) (0.0558) 
BlackPanel 0.188*** 1.207**
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* 
 (0.0529) (0.0639) 
HispanicPanel -0.0245 0.976 
 (0.0763) (0.0744) 
WhitePanel 0.000805 1.001 
 (0.0672) (0.0673) 
ProsPanel 0.0261 1.026 
 (0.0198) (0.0203) 
AppelFemale -0.289*** 0.749**
* 
 (0.0472) (0.0354) 
AppelMinority -0.0320 0.969 
 (0.0664) (0.0644) 
RespondFemale 0.141** 1.151** 
 (0.0689) (0.0793) 
RespondMinority 0.376*** 1.456**
* 
 (0.124) (0.180) 
Party 0.0359 1.037 
 (0.0504) (0.0522) 
PresParty 0.135*** 1.145**
* 
 (0.0509) (0.0583) 
Age 0.000193 1.000 
 (0.00178) (0.00178) 
GradDeg1 -0.0233 0.977 
 (0.0334) (0.0326) 
GradDeg2 -0.242 0.785 
 (0.226) (0.178) 
Decade40 0.0548 1.056 
 (0.0529) (0.0559) 
Decade50 -0.0284 0.972 
 (0.0520) (0.0505) 
Decade60 -0.0453 0.956 
 (0.0466) (0.0445) 
Decade70 0.117** 1.125** 
 (0.0468) (0.0526) 
Decade80 -0.0128 0.987 
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 (0.0480) (0.0474) 
Decade90 -0.249*** 0.780**
* 
 (0.0486) (0.0379) 
Circuit0 -0.0898 0.914 
 (0.110) (0.100) 
Circuit1 -0.128 0.880 
 (0.106) (0.0935) 
Circuit2 -2.97e-05 1.000 
 (0.107) (0.107) 
Circuit3 0.00750 1.008 
 (0.107) (0.108) 
Circuit4 -0.0328 0.968 
 (0.106) (0.103) 
Circuit5 -0.102 0.903 
 (0.107) (0.0965) 
Circuit6 -0.0176 0.983 
 (0.106) (0.104) 
Circuit7 -0.219** 0.804** 
 (0.106) (0.0852) 
Circuit8 -0.163 0.850 
 (0.106) (0.0901) 
Circuit9 -0.0213 0.979 
 (0.107) (0.105) 
Circuit10 -0.00440 0.996 
 (0.107) (0.107) 
Cut Point 1   
   
Constant -0.165 0.848 
 (0.214) (0.181) 
Cut Point 2   
   
Constant 0.145 1.156 
 (0.214) (0.247) 
   
Observations 40,523 40,523 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The first notable observation we can make from the 
results in Table 4 is that the three attributes of interest are 
not significantly correlated with individual judge voting 
behavior (the outcome variable in the first model).58  While 
this is not what we would expect, it is in line with past 
studies finding that gender, race, and other personal 
characteristics have little determinative effect on individual 
decisions.59  This also establishes a baseline from which we 
can make different conclusions about panel effects. 
The variables that do have some significance from the 
first model are female panel characteristics, black panel 
characteristics, the appellant’s gender, the appellee’s gender, 
the appellee’s race, and party of the judge’s appointing 
president.  Because both the coefficients for FemalePanel 
and BlackPanel are positive and significant over all types of 
cases, this seems to suggest that the presence of females and 
blacks increases the likelihood that an individual judge’s 
vote will be on the liberal side regardless of case type.  This 
supports the panel effects theory and hypothesis, and it is 
reasonable that ProsPanel is not significant here.  Gender 
and race are two more visible and apparent characteristics 
that may subconsciously influence other judges’ thinking and 
decision-making, whereas past experience is more difficult to 
discern.  Neither HispanicPanel nor WhitePanel is 
significant. 
If we look at the odds ratio for these two variables, we 
can see that with the addition of one female to a panel of 
judges, the odds of having a liberal decision versus a 
conservative or mixed decision are 1.125 times greater.  With 
                                                 
58 Although it is difficult to discern much meaning from the raw 
coefficients given in the ordinal logistic regression results, we can still take 
an initial, cursory look at the sign of the coefficients and the statistical 
significance in column 1 of Table 4. Because the column 1 coefficients show 
the change in the log of the odds, we can then examine the odds ratio in 
column 2 that displays the proportional odds ratios for the ordered logit 
model. The odds ratios shown are obtained by exponentiating the 
coefficients in column 1 (ecoefficient), and give us a much clearer sense of how 
these variables affect voting behavior. 
59 See Goldman, supra note 30. 
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a one unit increase in the number of blacks on the panel, the 
predicted odds of observing a more liberal decision are 1.207 
times greater.  Thus, each additional female is associated 
with a 12.5% increase in the odds of jumping a level in the 
outcome variable (either from conservative “1” to mixed “2” 
or liberal “3”, or from conservative “1” or mixed “2” to liberal 
“3”) and each additional black is associated with about a 
20.7% increase in increasing a level.60  
Thus, although variables representing individual 
characteristics like Female and Black are not significant, 
FemalePanel and BlackPanel are.  This bolsters the 
prediction that their presence may still influence other 
judges on the same panel even though a judge’s individual 
attributes may not have an effect on his or her own vote.  
These results from the first test support past scholars’ 
statement that “background variables . . . mask too wide a 
variety of conditioning experiences for us to expect them to 
be directly and clearly associated with voting behavior and 
thus to be able to account for a significant portion of the 
variation of the behavior.”61  However, these scholars also 
neglected to take panel influences into account, which we 
found were significant even in the first model.  This first test 
serves as an interesting starting point for interpreting panel 
effects. 
It is also worth discussing other significant covariates 
in this model.  The negative sign of the ProsCase coefficient 
shows that criminal cases decrease the odds of a more liberal 
decision.  The odds ratio here is 0.312, so for an increase in 
the unit of this independent variable from 0 to 1, there is a 
68.8% (1 – 0.312) decreased likelihood of a more liberal 
decision.  This is an interesting observation, as it shows that 
                                                 
60 Notice that throughout this Note, the author asserts that the 
odds that the decision “is more liberal” rather than “is liberal,” because the 
odds ratio predicts the probability of jumping a level, either from 
conservative to mixed or liberal, or from conservative or mixed to liberal. It 
does not tell us the chances of the decision being a conservative, mixed, or 
liberal one. 
61 Goldman, supra note 30, at 496. 
370 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
 
judges are, as a whole, tougher on the defendant and more 
likely to vote conservatively in criminal cases.62 
It is not too surprising that the party of the judge’s 
appointing president is significant in determining an 
individual judge’s vote.  This suggests that federal appeals 
judges vote in ways that align with the political preferences 
of the president who appointed them.  The way the two-party 
variables were coded make it so that a one unit increase from 
0 to 1 is a change from Republican to Democrat.  Thus, if the 
judge’s appointing president is a Democrat, the odds that the 
individual judge’s vote will be on the more liberal side is 
14.5% greater.63 
Finally, there are some significant results in the 
dummy variables this Note included to capture changes over 
time and region.  The 1970s showed positive significance, 
which could be explained by the substantial increase in 
diversity of the courts during those years.  During that 
decade, there was a 12.5% increase in the odds that an 
individual judge’s vote was more liberal.  Individual voting 
behavior in the 1990s, however, had a 22% decreased 
likelihood of being more liberal.  In addition, judges’ votes in 
the Seventh Circuit (with jurisdiction over the federal 
district courts in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) had a 
19.6% decreased likelihood of being more liberal.   
 
                                                 
62 The litigants’ characteristics are important, though the 
interpretation of these results is more difficult and could be explored in 
further studies. If the appellee is a female or minority, both of these 
characteristics increase the likelihood of a more liberal decision by 15.1% 
and 45.6%, respectively. In contrast, only the appellant’s gender seems to 
matter, but here, a female appellant actually decreases the odds by around 
25% that the outcome will be more liberal. This may tell us something 
about the way judges perceive those who choose to appeal cases versus 
those who are being brought back to court. 
63 The positive sign of the coefficient (or the fact that the odds 
ratio is greater than one) makes sense for the most part, for even if liberal 
and conservative ideologies are not synonymous with the Democratic and 
Republican parties, they are aligned in many cases given the way the case 
outcomes are coded. 
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2. Panel Effects 
Table 5. Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for Panel 
Decision 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Logit coefficient Odds ratio 
   
GenderCase 0.230** 1.259** 
 (0.107) (0.134) 
FemalePanel(1) 0.132*** 1.141*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0527) 
FemalePanel(2+) 0.480*** 1.616*** 
 (0.153) (0.248) 
GenderCase*FemalePanel(1) -0.648*** 0.523*** 
 (0.244) (0.128) 
GenderCase*FemalePanel(2+) 13.98*** 1.182e+06*
** 
 (0.470) (555,670) 
RaceCase 29.61*** 7.219e+12*
** 
 (0.698) (5.036e+12) 
BlackPanel(1) 0.242*** 1.273*** 
 (0.0477) (0.0607) 
BlackPanel(2+) 0.442* 1.556* 
 (0.241) (0.376) 
RaceCase*BlackPanel(1) -0.368 0.692 
 (0.324) (0.225) 
RaceCase*BlackPanel(2+) -15.30*** 2.26e-
07*** 
 (0.653) (1.47e-07) 
HispanicPanel(1) -0.0698 0.933 
 (0.0677) (0.0631) 
HispanicPanel(2+) 0.138 1.148 
 (0.290) (0.333) 
RaceCase*HispanicPanel(1) 0.162 1.176 
 (0.408) (0.480) 
WhitePanel(1) 0.394 1.483 
 (0.363) (0.538) 
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WhitePanel(2+) 0.395 1.484 
 (0.367) (0.544) 
RaceCase*WhitePanel(1) -29.22*** 0*** 
 (0.565) (0) 
RaceCase*WhitePanel(2+) -29.51*** 0*** 
 (0.475) (0) 
ProsCase -1.113*** 0.328*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0156) 
ProsPanel(1) 0.111*** 1.117*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0362) 
ProsPanel(2+) 0.0923** 1.097** 
 (0.0382) (0.0419) 
ProsCase*ProsPanel(1) -0.156** 0.856** 
 (0.0606) (0.0519) 
ProsCase*ProsPanel(2+) -0.0926 0.912 
 (0.0723) (0.0659) 
AppelFemale -0.310*** 0.733*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0348) 
AppelMinority -0.0515 0.950 
 (0.0671) (0.0637) 
RespondFemale 0.109 1.115 
 (0.0695) (0.0775) 
RespondMinority 0.394*** 1.483*** 
 (0.124) (0.183) 
Party 0.00328 1.003 
 (0.0506) (0.0508) 
PresPart 0.0906* 1.095* 
 (0.0510) (0.0558) 
Age 0.00204 1.002 
 (0.00176) (0.00176) 
GradDeg1 -0.0183 0.982 
 (0.0333) (0.0327) 
GradDeg2 -0.355 0.701 
 (0.230) (0.161) 
Decade40 0.0784 1.082 
 (0.0531) (0.0575) 
Decade50 0.00465 1.005 
 (0.0521) (0.0524) 
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Decade60 -0.0266 0.974 
 (0.0467) (0.0455) 
Decade70 0.166*** 1.181*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0554) 
Decade80 0.00558 1.006 
 (0.0482) (0.0485) 
Decade90 -0.266*** 0.767*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0374) 
Circuit0 -0.0715 0.931 
 (0.111) (0.103) 
Circuit1 -0.119 0.887 
 (0.108) (0.0955) 
Circuit2 0.00594 1.006 
 (0.108) (0.108) 
Circuit3 0.0222 1.022 
 (0.108) (0.110) 
Circuit4 -0.0376 0.963 
 (0.107) (0.103) 
Circuit5 -0.0934 0.911 
 (0.108) (0.0986) 
Circuit6 -0.0205 0.980 
 (0.107) (0.105) 
Circuit7 -0.227** 0.797** 
 (0.107) (0.0854) 
Circuit8 -0.180* 0.835* 
 (0.107) (0.0895) 
Circuit9 -0.0265 0.974 
 (0.108) (0.105) 
Circuit10 -0.00463 0.995 
 (0.108) (0.108) 
Cut Point 1   
   
Constant 0.232 1.261 
 (0.402) (0.507) 
Cut Point 2   
   
Constant 0.546 1.726 
 (0.402) (0.694) 
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Observations 40,523 40,523 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from the second model shown in Table 5 
have much greater significance for the three primary panel 
variables of interest.  This contrasts greatly with the 
individual characteristic variables in the first model.  
Analyzing the results of panel characteristics in the second 
model is a bit more complex because of the multiple 
interaction effects for each possible scenario.  There is one 
interaction term for when there is one female on the panel of 
a gender case, another term for when there are two or more 
females on the panel of a gender case, and so on for the three 
races and two other attributes.  We are also given the 
coefficients and odds ratios for when FemalePanel (as well as 
BlackPanel, WhitePanel, etc.) is equal to 1 and when it is 
equal to 2.  Thus, not only can we evaluate how the presence 
of a single female, black, white, Hispanic, or past prosecutor 
affects other judges and case outcomes, but we can also 
evaluate how the presence of multiple females, blacks, 
whites, Hispanics, or past prosecutors affects other judges 
and case outcomes. 
As anticipated in the hypothesis, the results from the 
second test show that gender generally affected panel 
decisions.  The presence of one female on a panel of judges 
increased the likelihood that the final panel ruling would be 
on the more liberal side by 14.1% across all case types.  For 
two or more females, the odds increased to 61.6% across all 
case types.  This is a significant finding, as it tells us what a 
large difference gender diversity can make on the courts.  
A surprising result was that in gender cases alone, 
the presence of one female decreased the odds that the 
outcome would be more liberal (by 47.7%), but with two or 
more females, it would return to an extraordinarily large 
increase in the likelihood of a more liberal decision.  These 
unusual and unexpected results might be a result of the fact 
that out of the 414 cases deemed “gender cases,” only 11 of 
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them had two or more females on the panel.  Thus, when 
interpreting the effect of female judicial presence, it might be 
be wise to rely only on the FemalePanel(1) and 
FemalePanel(2+) variables or on the gender case interaction 
term with only one female, because they span across a much 
larger sample of cases.  However, since these two types of 
variables have opposing results, we must conclude from 
these results alone that while females influence others to 
vote more liberally as a whole, they do not necessarily do so 
in gender-specific cases. 
Just like with gender, the odds of a more liberal 
decision are greater (1.273 times to be exact) across all case 
types with the presence of one black judge. With two or more, 
this number increases to 1.556.  However, when limited to 
only race cases, this 27.3% and 55.6% increase in the 
likelihood of a more liberal decision disappears.  The only 
interaction term that is significant here is with a race case 
and two or more blacks on the panel, and the odds ratio is so 
small that it is almost completely certain that the case 
outcome will not be liberal as opposed to mixed or 
conservative, or liberal or mixed as opposed to conservative.  
Because the racial diversity of the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
was not particularly high from 1925 to 2002, it is not 
surprising to find parallels to the gender issues described 
earlier. Out of the 807 cases categorized as “race cases,” 
there are only five cases in which there are two or more 
blacks on the panel.  Although this Note tried to evade this 
problem by coding panels with two or three females, blacks, 
and others together (for example, there are 496 cases with 
two females but just twelve cases with three), the small 
sample of gender or race cases interfered nonetheless. It is 
possible that in those five race-related cases, the black 
judges and their colleagues on the panels voted 
conservatively; a larger sample might tell us something 
different. 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to speculate this given 
the constraints of the dataset, so we would be better off 
focusing on the original BlackPanel variables unencumbered 
by case type specification.  Even in spite of the small number 
of relevant cases, it is interesting to note that the presence of 
376 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
 
females and blacks raises the probability of a more liberal 
decision overall, but tends to do the opposite on cases that 
relate to their attributes. Possible explanations of this voting 
behavior will be explored in Part III. 
The results for Hispanic judges were not significant, 
so we cannot make any conclusions about them at this time 
in this study, except as part of a larger “nonwhite” group 
when evaluating the WhitePanel variables and interaction 
terms.  The two WhitePanel variables that looked at all cases 
did not yield any significance, but when interacted with the 
presence of a race case, a panel with one white (and two 
nonwhites), two whites (and one nonwhite), or three whites 
would again greatly decrease the odds of a more liberal 
decision.  Though the tables say the odds ratios are 0, these 
are rounded figures from the infinitesimal number e-29.  This 
very tiny chance of a more liberal decision makes sense given 
the results from the RaceCase*BlackPanel interaction terms 
discussed above (although the nonwhites include Hispanics 
as well here). 
The variables on past prosecutorial experience seem 
to correspond with the hypotheses that past prosecutors vote 
more conservatively in criminal cases.  Although the 
presence of prosecutors does not have much of a conservative 
effect on decisions (quite the contrary in fact), it does when it 
is a criminal case.  The ProsPanel(1) and ProsPanel(2+) 
variables that indicate panels with 1 and 2 or more past 
prosecutors, respectively, both have positive coefficients and 
odds ratios greater than one (though not by much).  Thus, 
the presence of prosecutors slightly increases the odds that 
the decision will be more liberal (by 11.7% if there is one, and 
by 9.7% if there are two or more).  However, in criminal 
cases, the presence of a past prosecutor decreases the 
likelihood that the decision is more liberal, which was 
predicted.  With one prosecutor, the probability decreases by 
14.4%.64 
We can also see that all three types of cases, not just 
prosecution, are significant.  While gender and race cases are 
                                                 
64 The coefficient for two or more prosecutors on a criminal case 
was also negative, but not significant. 
No. 3:341]          BROADENING DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH 377 
 
associated with more liberal outcomes, criminal cases are 
associated with more conservative outcomes.  Most of the 
variables that were significant for individual judicial vote are 
still significant for panel decision, specifically the appellant’s 
gender, the appellee’s race, the party of the appointing 
president (though much less significant), the Seventh 
Circuit, and the decades 1970 and 1990.  Once again, a 
female appellant decreases the likelihood of a more liberal 
decision, this time by 26.7%, whereas a minority appellee 
increases it by 48.3%.  The only other differences between 
the results in the two models (besides levels of significance) 
are that the appellee’s gender is no longer significant in the 
second test, and that the Eighth Circuit is moderately 
significant as well.65 
In sum, in the first model, individual judges’ personal 
characteristics do not affect the way they vote.  However, 
having females or blacks on a panel can influence others’ 
individual votes into being more liberal, regardless of case 
type.  In the second model, we found that panel 
characteristics are significant all around, though in some 
unexpected and unclear ways.  In non-gender cases, the 
presence of females greatly increased the odds of a more 
liberal decision, as did the presence of blacks in non-race 
                                                 
65 It is reasonable that the two significant region variables, 
Circuit7 and Circuit8, decrease the odds that the decision will be a more 
liberal one (by 20.3% and 16.5%, respectively), as the Seventh and Eighth 
Circuits are two of the most conservative circuits “in accordance with 
standard lore.” Sunstein, supra note 18, at 108. As for results for changes 
over time, cases in the 1970s increased the odds of a more liberal decision 
by 18.1%, and cases in the 1990s decreased the probability of a more 
liberal decision by 23.3%. While these differences can be partly attributed 
to the changing docket over the years, these significant results may also be 
explained by the appointing president’s administration and party. In the 
1970s, 59% of the federal judiciary was appointed by a Democratic 
president, and in the 1990s, that percentage decreased to just 33%. Id. at 
123. Additionally, the Carter Administration in the late 1970s was the 
first to implement a policy of affirmative action in his judicial 
appointments and appointed more women and racial minorities, which 
might be another reason for the significant results for decade. Jon 
Gottschall, Carter’s Judicial  Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative 
Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 
JUDICATURE 165, 167 (1983). 
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cases.  In gender and race cases, results were more mixed.  
Hispanics had no significant effect, while whites decreased 
the odds of liberalness in race cases.  Finally, judges with 
past experience as a prosecutor increased the odds of a 
liberal decision across all cases, but decreased those odds in 
criminal cases. 
 
3. Predicted Probabilities 
Figure 1. Probability of Liberal Versus 
Conservative Rulings in Gender and Non-Gender 
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Figure 2. Probability of Liberal Versus Conservative 
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Figure 3. Probability of Liberal Versus Conservative 
Rulings in Race and Non-Race Related Panel Cases 
(HispanicPanel)* 
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Figure 4. Probability of Liberal Versus Conservative 






When interpreting ordinal logistic regressions, odds 
ratios can be misleading in some cases.  It can be helpful to 
supplement the information from above with an alternate 
method of predicted probabilities, which many find makes 
the results more tangible and meaningful.66  As shown in 
                                                 
66 Using the margins command in Stata this Note evaluated the 
predicted probabilities for conservative, mixed, and liberal decisions for 
each of the three key attributes, while every other variable is held at the 
mean. For each of the variables FemalePanel, BlackPanel, HispanicPanel, 
WhitePanel, and ProsPanel, there are six possible scenarios. 
The author has structured it in such a way that there are 
predicted probabilities for each of these six possible outcomes, which 
allows us to compare the same characteristic across all scenarios at once. 





















382 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
 
Figures 1–4, we can see the predicted probabilities of a 
conservative and liberal decision when we set and hold all 
other predictor variables at their mean values.  Here, the 
numbers do not tell us the probability of jumping a level to a 
more liberal decision, but rather the probability of each 
outcome.  Regardless of variable or case type, the predicted 
probability of a mixed decision is always very low compared 
to a conservative or liberal decision (never above a 10% 
probability), which is why they are not included in the 
figures.  
The predicted probability of a liberal decision 
increases from 35.9% to 39% when one female is added to a 
panel on non-gender cases, and then again from 39% to 
47.6% when yet another female or two are added to a panel.  
Of course, these observations should and do align with our 
conclusions from the odds ratios above, but predicted 
probabilities allow us to look at this information from a 
different angle.  For example, we see that the likelihood of a 
liberal decision decreases from 41.4% to 29.5% when one 
female is added to a panel on a gender case, but then 
increases greatly with the presence of two or more females. 
Similarly, the presence of one black on the panel for a 
non-race case increases the probability of a liberal decision 
from 35.8% to 41.6%, and then from 41.6% to 46.7% with two 
or more blacks, as can be seen in Figure 2. However, this 
percentage decreases when the case is race-related, and even 
more so with the addition of blacks for those cases.  Although 
Hispanics do not seem to vote according to any specific 
pattern in non-race cases, the probability that the case 
outcome will be liberal on a race case increases slightly from 
38.1% to 40.3% when a Hispanic is on the panel (see Figure 
3).  Overall, however, Hispanics seem to vote on the 
conservative side, which is something we would not be able 
to glean from the coefficients and odds ratios alone. 
                                                                                                         
following way: (1) a non-gender case with zero females on a panel, (2) a 
non-gender case with one female on a panel, (3) a non-gender case with 
two or three females on a panel, (4) a gender case with zero females on a 
panel, (5) a gender case with one female on a panel, and (6) a gender case 
with two or three females on a panel. The five other figures are ordered in 
the same way for each respective characteristic and case type. 
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For judges with prior prosecutorial experience, the 
difference is even more apparent in the predicted 
probabilities.  For non-criminal (civil) cases, panels with a 
past prosecutor have just a 45.1% probability of reaching a 
conservative decision.  In contrast, in a criminal case with a 
prosecutor on the panel, this probability is significantly 
higher at 74.5%.  By looking solely at the predicted 
probabilities, however, one might think that the presence of 
prosecutors does not have any effect on the panel decision, as 
all outcomes in criminal cases are more likely to be 
conservative.  Yet we know from the odds ratios that in 
criminal cases, one prosecutor decreases the likelihood that 
the decision is more liberal by 14.4%, and with two or more, 
the probability decreases by 8.8%. 
Thus, while predicted probabilities allow us to 
analyze the specific differences for each scenario, as well as 
observe the predicted probability not just of a “more liberal” 
decision but also of a liberal, mixed, and conservative 
decision, we cannot rely on them alone.  Both predicted 
probabilities and odds ratios are needed to gain a 
comprehensive picture of the data results and their 
implications.67 
 
B. Discussion of Panel Effects Results 
Although not every result matched up with the 
hypotheses, the results have opened up new avenues for 
discussion and possible interpretations.  The main takeaway, 
however, is that panel effects and the presence of certain 
characteristics are strong and highly significant in 
determining the overall panel decision.  In contrast, 
individual characteristics do not affect one’s own vote, which 
is consistent with past studies’ conclusions.  In a majority of 
cases, the presence of females and blacks on a panel of 
appeals court judges increases the odds of a more liberal 
                                                 
67 The figures for predicted probabilities of individual judge 
characteristics have not been included, as there are very few differences 
among the probabilities of a conservative, mixed, or liberal vote regardless 
of case type or the characteristics of the judge. 
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ruling.  The finding that the presence of a prior prosecutor on 
a panel decreases the likelihood of a liberal outcome only in 
criminal cases confirms the hypothesis that one’s past career 
experiences can shape one’s view of important issues, such as 
the criminal justice system.  
Although this Note could have made the panel 
variables binary to see the effect of the mere presence of 
certain characteristics on voting behavior, it is useful to look 
for any discrepancies between panels with more than one 
female and panels in which the female is outnumbered.  As it 
turns out, we were able to observe these differences for 
several variables. Perhaps what was most surprising about 
the panel characteristics results were the variables 
FemalePanel and BlackPanel when interacted with 
GenderCase and RaceCase, respectively.  Here, the presence 
of one or more females or blacks significantly decreased the 
likelihood of a more liberal decision in gender and race cases, 
which was the opposite of the original hypothesis.  This 
Note’s original hypothesis was that the presence of females 
and blacks would raise the probability of a more liberal 
outcome in cases involving, say, employment discrimination, 
because not only do females and racial minorities bring in a 
new perspective to the law, but they might also seek 
different results that benefit litigants similar to them in 
regards to gender and race.  Furthermore, the concept of 
panel effects implies that the visual presence of female or 
minority judges makes other judges on the panel more aware 
of and sensitive to issues of gender or racial discrimination, 
whether the female or minority judges say something to that 
effect or not. 
There are several possible explanations for why these 
results did not adhere to this theory, other than the coding of 
gender and race cases.  As mentioned, the coding of the 
dependent variables on a scale of 1 to 3 captures only the 
final vote.  It is thus difficult to account for the details of the 
actual opinion and case.  That there are so few gender or race 
cases with two or more females or blacks on the panel also 
explains the odd results in those cases.  Additionally, 
although federal judges have discretion, the law and the 
facts often dictate a particular outcome in cases and thus 
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limit what judges can do.68  The relatively low reversal rate 
on the United States Courts of Appeals reveals another 
possible reason for the results, especially since the dataset 
and the model did not include this factor.69 
Another possible reason for the results is that the 
effects of personal traits that we might assume to be very 
strong in forming one’s perception of the law are “washed out 
by the preappointment screening process.”70  The screening 
process is a careful one, with each of the President’s 
nominees undergoing an extensive vetting process by the 
Senate.  It would be difficult to confirm a judge with 
notoriously strong political stances—especially in regards to 
gender or race issues—because of some people’s fear that she 
would allow those beliefs to cloud her judgment.  A tight 
ideological control over the judicial selection process is often 
the main reason why certain judges are nominated and 
ultimately confirmed over others. 
The two characteristics of race and gender are 
especially sensitive today—they are often deemed diversity 
“plus factors,” but only when those judges already fit the bill 
in every other way.  Sometimes this means relatively more 
conservative judges, especially since most have been through 
the same elite educational and professional processes.  
                                                 
68 Sunstein, supra note 18, at 83. 
69 UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL 




df (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). In 2001, the percent of cases reversed was 
9.2%. In 2002, the rate was 9.6%. Id. “Using quantitative empirical 
methods to analyze judicial decisions has some inherent limitations 
because it is simply impossible to control for all the relevant factors 
underlying a decision.” Cross, supra note 1, at 6. In fact, it is virtually 
impossible to even name all the relevant factors underlying each judicial 
decision. In a perfect world, we would be able to account for everything, 
but given missing information from datasets and for the sake of keeping 
this Note’s long model clean and manageable, some factors had to be left 
out. However, in spite of this inevitable obstacle, this Note still included 
the most significant judge and case characteristics that might determine 
policy preferences or otherwise affect the outcome of an appeal. 
70 Cross, supra note 1, at 72. 
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Federal judicial positions are not jobs open to just anyone, as 
can sometimes be the case with elected office.  For example, 
a conservative president might appoint minorities while still 
ensuring that they are conservative.  Thus, voting 
similarities between black and white judges either indicate 
that the courts represent “a traditional, conservative black 
elite, selected for its behavioral conformity” or that “a 
combination of institutional, role, and self-imposed demands” 
pressures black judges to conform to the voting patterns 
established by a dominantly white legal system.71 
This pressure to conform is also known as “collegial 
concurrence,” which occurs when one judge joins his 
colleagues and refuses to dissent publicly.72  As mentioned, a 
major issue with studies like these is not having a sufficient 
number of female or minority judges, especially in the earlier 
decades.  Because females and blacks may be relatively new 
to the system, some might be reluctant to dissent from the 
majority too often or be overly vocal in presenting new 
perspectives that might advance a particular group’s rights.  
In an attempt to be perceived favorably by the other judges 
and preserve the spirit of consensus and unanimity on 
appellate panels, they might yield when confronted with two 
other judges already in agreement.73 
In other cases, female or minority judges might 
overcompensate to appear objective and fair in certain cases, 
thinking that others will expect them to vote liberally.  One 
study found that black males did not vote more liberally than 
white males in racial discrimination cases, and suggested 
that “blacks avoid partisan identification with issues so 
salient to their own career and life opportunities.”74  An 
analogous situation is when a female or minority politician 
tries not to allow gender or race to be her identifying feature 
as a policymaker, and thus does not advocate for her own 
“interest group.”  For example, in the federal district courts, 
because black judges tend to identify as liberal, some might 
                                                 
71 Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of 
Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884, 892 (1978). 
72 Sunstein, supra note 18, at 148. 
73 Id. at 15. 
74 Gottschall, supra note 65, at 172. 
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expect that they will vote in ways more sympathetic to 
criminal defendants, especially black defendants.75  
However, studies have shown that there are no significant 
differences between black and white judges in criminal 
cases.76  Another explanation for these conformity effects is 
that one might genuinely become convinced that the other 
judges have a point if they are all in agreement.  
Experiments have indeed shown that people are easily 
swayed by and highly susceptible to fellow colleagues’ 
opinions.77  Another related explanation is not that the 
female or black judge wants to appear neutral, but rather 
that the other two male or white judges on the panel do. 
They may be wary of the potential influence the female or 
black judge may have on the decision-making process and 
thus overcompensate to try not to let that affect their 
judgment. 
Finally, there is one more explanation for these 
results that is especially applicable to the methodology.  One 
study found that in controversial cases involving abortion or 
the death penalty, judges’ individual votes were “impervious 
to panel effects,”78 and any possible influence their 
colleagues might have had were outweighed by their own 
firm convictions.79  Debating and discussing issues that the 
judges already felt strongly about may have only pushed 
them further toward what they initially believed.  This 
entrenchment may help explain why the presence of females 
and blacks had an overall liberal effect on the decisions, but 
was not strong enough for gender- or race-specific cases.  
Thus, although Kastellec stated that panel effects may be 
apparent only in the more ideological cases as opposed to the 
“more routine cases,”80 these results show that it might 
actually be the opposite. 
                                                 
75 Susan Welch, Michael Combs & John Gruhl, Do Black Judges 
Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126, 127 (1988). 
76 Id. at 128. 
77 Sunstein, supra note 18, at 74–75. 
78 Id. at 62. 
79 Id. 
80 Kastellec, supra note 21, at 380. 
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Whether because of the screening process, selection 
effects, normative social influences, or case type, there are 
numerous explanations for why females and blacks vote 
more liberally across all cases but less so on gender- or race-
specific cases.  Whatever the reason, it makes sense that the 
same does not hold true for past prosecutors in criminal 
cases.  The trait of prior prosecutorial experience is not 
relatively new to the federal bench, and there is no pressure 
for judges with such experience to act in a particular way or 
to defy stereotypes.  The possibility of pressure to conform 
may be a new issue with the judicial system that is even 




Depending on how one sees it, the liberal influence 
female and black judges have on a decision in the court can 
be both a good and bad thing. Some might find that this only 
confirms the need for greater diversity on federal courts in 
order to counter the long-held judicial legacy of white male 
judges.  Other conservatives may fear what changes this may 
bring.  Still, they might take the decreased likelihood of a 
liberal decision on gender or race cases when females or 
blacks are on the panel as a sign that the system is not 
flawed, and judges are not actually being unnecessarily 
swayed into voting differently.  At the very least, it might 
indicate that we should focus on other flaws within the 
system.  Based on the results for prior prosecutors, advocates 
for criminal justice reform may want to pay more attention 
to judicial appointees and support nominees who have more 
unique career backgrounds. 
Perhaps it is still too soon to make any of these 
conclusions about the U.S. Courts of Appeals or federal 
courts at large.  It is difficult to make any definitive 
statements until the databases are updated to include cases 
that happened over the past fifteen years, a time period 
during which much tumultuous social change has occurred, 
along with many controversial cases covering topics that 
have everything to do with gender, race, and criminal justice.  
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Even when the bench has diversified more and there are 
more relevant cases included in the sample, we still must be 
cautious about making generalizations. After all, we can see 
from the summary statistics in Table 2 that females, blacks, 
and Hispanics made up only 3.42%, 4.87%, and 1.56% of the 
total appeals court judge population in the dataset, 
respectively. It is thus surprising that past studies have 
made broad conclusions about female voting behavior when 
examining only one or two specific types of cases over just a 
few years.  Even if the panel influences were present and 
meaningful, they may not have been strong enough to 
outweigh the dominant influence white male judges have, 
something not captured in the simple coding of a 1, 2, or 3 
decision.  
It is more difficult to apply the same possible 
explanations given for gender and race to prior prosecutorial 
experience. The presence of a prior prosecutor on a criminal 
case increases the chances of a more conservative decision 
that does not favor the defendant.  Past studies have 
discovered bipartisan consensus and similar voting behavior 
across party lines for criminal cases.81  This Note found that 
prior experience as a prosecutor does create differences in 
voting on criminal cases, which has interesting implications.  
These significant effects on criminal outcomes suggest that 
the pursuit of diversity in career background is just as 
important as the pursuit of diversity of other characteristics 
in reflecting the entire nation’s views, especially given the 
homogeneity of most federal judges’ career paths.82  Thus, if 
a future presidential administration wants to follow 
                                                 
81 Sunstein, supra note 18, at 61. 
82 Out of President Clinton’s 61 appointees to the U.S. courts of 
appeals, 37.7% of had prosecutorial experience, and only 29.5% lacked 
either prosecutorial or judicial experience). Sheldon Goldman & Elliot E. 
Slotnick, Introduction: Clinton’s Judicial Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 227, 244, 
249 (2001). See also New York Times Editorial Board, The Homogeneous 
Federal Bench, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/opinion/the-homogeneous-federal-
bench.html [https://perma.cc/SC6J-L68F ] (85% of President Obama’s 
nominees to the federal bench have been corporate attorneys or 
prosecutors, and fewer than 4% have worked in public interest 
organizations). 
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President Nixon’s lead and appoint judges who are tough on 
crime, it might look for prior prosecutorial experience.  If a 
presidential administration prioritizes reforming the 
criminal justice system, it might do well to nominate judges 
with career backgrounds that differ from the prosecutorial 
norm. 
Overall, the results are not as straightforward as the 
original hypotheses, which were that the presence of females 
and racial minorities would increase the likelihood of a more 
liberal decision, particularly in gender- and race-related 
cases, and that the presence of past prosecutors would 
decrease the likelihood of a more liberal decision in criminal 
cases.  However, if the hypotheses were sustained, this Note 
would not have been able to delve deeper into the more 
detailed and realistic aspects of judicial decision-making.  It 
would have been easy to attribute and reduce deliberations 
to judges’ personal characteristics, but the results instead 
showed that there are many other equally important social 
and psychological factors that cannot be fully accounted for 
in empirical studies.  Phenomena like the pressure to 
conform, especially as somewhat of a newcomer to the bench, 
often slip the minds of the public when we discuss federal 
judges and minority representation. This could mean that 
more attention should be paid not only to the relationship 
between personal attributes and voting behavior but also to 
the other pressures and difficulties that certain judges must 
face. 
A possible area of extension in the study of judicial 
outcomes relates to the process by which state court judges 
are selected.  Comparing voting patterns between federal 
and state courts would be able to give some insight into 
differences between decisions made by judges who were 
appointed and decisions made by judges who were elected by 
the public.  Although this Note alone cannot tell us which 
method is preferable, one study83 stated that the election of 
state judges has a significant impact on the religious, 
                                                 
83 Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on 
the Characteristics of Judges – Reconsidered, 6 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 579, 588 
(1972). 
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educational, and career diversity of elected judges.84  One 
might then conclude that bringing the selection process to 
the masses means selecting judges with ideological views 
and characteristics that align with those of the constituency.  
This is not to say that the appointment system is devoid of 
politics, however.  According to one study, appointing 
presidents follow one of two models that determine their 
judicial nominations.85  The first is the policy model, in 
which presidents seek to appoint judges who have similar 
policy preferences—this theory is supported by the results. 
An example of the policy model is when the Nixon 
Administration sought to appoint “law and order” judges who 
were tough on crime.86  The second is a partisan model, in 
which presidents try to reward party loyalty by nominating 
judges whose ideological views reflect those of the judge’s 
population.87 
Yet despite the general understanding that many 
nominated judges can be political activists who reflect “the 
values and outlook of the appointing administration,”88 
judicial appointments are not entirely driven by politics 
either.  Presidents do not have unlimited control, as the 
judge must be palatable to the Senate.  There are structures 
in place to prevent extreme judges from being appointed to 
the bench.  Judicial appointments are the product of many 
factors: competence, ideology and party affiliation, and, of 
course, being in the right place at the right time.89  
Nominated judges are drawn from a list of possible 
candidates that usually consist of a “vast network of friends, 
acquaintances, and friends of friends.”90  All things 
                                                 
84 Id. 
85 Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, 
Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 
54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 627–28 (2001). 
86 Gottschall, supra note 65, at 166. 
87 Giles et al., supra note 85, at 627. 
88 Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 186, 214 (1967). 
89 Id. at 186. 
90 Id. at 189. 
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considered, however, it is still an elite, largely closed-off, and 
private process that is only open to a select few. 
Because the study has found that there are indeed 
panel effects that either increase or decrease the likelihood of 
a more liberal decision, it is important that we now turn to 
another one of this study’s original questions, which is 
whether or not these findings should increase calls for 
greater diversity on the courts.  More simply, now that we 
have confirmed the influence of the presence of females, 
racial minorities, and past prosecutors on judicial outcomes, 
is the pursuit of diversity still desirable?  Our initial reaction 
might be an unqualified yes because of all of diversity’s 
benefits, both for its descriptive and substantive 
representation. 
The news that there are now a greater number of 
“non-traditional” judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals has 
been heralded as a positive development.91  There is the 
symbolic diversity element that “helps promote trust in the 
[legal] system.”92  The image of judges who are not white or 
male can serve as visible role models for young students.  
There is also, of course, the substantive diversity that comes 
from the inclusion of new perspectives and competing 
arguments.  This increases the potential for dissent, which 
increases “the probability that the law will be followed.”93  
Diversifying courts can also check extreme, lawless decisions, 
                                                 
91 As of July 2014, the U.S. Courts of Appeals is composed of a 
majority of “non-traditional” judges with the appointment of Pamela 
Harris to the Fourth Circuit. Barry J. McMillion, Demographic Diversity 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals: An Update, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT, GOVERNMENT AND FINANCE DIVISION (2014). “Non-
traditional” here refers to those who belong to “demographic groups from 
which, historically, individuals were seldom, if ever, selected for federal 
judgeships,” namely females, African Americans, Asian Americans, and 
Hispanics. Id. Before President Obama took office, non-traditional judges 
only comprised 39.4% of the active federal appeals court judges, and there 
were no Asian American appellate court judges. Today, white men are still 
the plurality of all active appeals court judges, but the percentage of non-
traditional judges is now 50.3%, with 86 non-traditional and 85 traditional 
judges. Id. 
92 Hsu, supra note 13, at 115. 
93 Sunstein, supra note 18, at 135. 
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something especially critical in cases when the law is 
ambiguous.  
One qualitative study uses the example of Japanese 
American internment to support the claim that appointing 
more Asian American and other racial minorities to the 
bench can “ensure that the legislature never passes similar 
legislation.”94  A better understanding of racial issues can 
lead to a more inclusive rule of law that takes all 
perspectives into account.  All of this assumes, however, that 
conformity effects will not be as prevalent, and that 
minorities on the courts will voice their true opinions. 
Scholars claim that the ultimate goal here is “diversity of 
reasonable views,”95 and that the President and Senate 
should actively pursue such a range of opinion.  Without this 
diversity, we risk facing unequal treatment and application 
of the law, and panels that give extreme or unfair rulings.  
Judicial appointments are thus an opportunity for presidents 
to leave a legacy that outlasts their tenure and shape the 
court system into one that better resembles the changing 
society it serves.96 
However, this simple view has made “diversity” a 
buzzword used to justify numerous policies and settle all 
sorts of arguments.  After all, it is difficult to criticize a 
principle that is a fundamental American value.  Is it an 
objectively “good” thing that the presence of females and 
minorities increases the probability of a more liberal 
decision, and is it an objectively “good” thing that the 
presence of past prosecutors increases the probability of a 
conservative decision?  If the law is truly to be unbiased and 
binding, judges should vote the same way regardless of who 
else is on the panel.  Symbolic and substantive diversity 
aside, increased diversification and the subsequent shift 
toward the left over time may not necessarily be a positive 
                                                 
94 Hsu, supra note 13, at 119. 
95 Sunstein, supra note 18, at 138. 
96 Philip Rucker, Obama Pushing to Diversify Federal Judiciary 
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development.  Regardless, arguments that diversity on the 
bench leads to judicial impartiality because it “ensure[s] that 
a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial 
decision-making” are compelling and worth considering.97  
Another argument for the continued support of 
diversification within the judicial branch is that this is an 
overdue process to counteract years of judges who may not 
have had certain groups’ best interests at heart in the past. 
There have also been calls for other kinds of diversity 
in religion, sexual orientation, and professional experience.  
While this Note looked at prior prosecutorial experience, 
many liberal groups have also urged the government to 
nominate fewer prior corporate lawyers and more attorneys 
with experience in academia or the public interest, such as 
public defenders.  Most of the time, federal judges do not 
come from civil rights organizations or small practices.98  
Prior public defenders might counteract a bias against 
criminal defendants that some prior prosecutors may hold, 
and judges who have advocated for clients at lower levels of 
socioeconomic status might place more emphasis on 
achieving justice for all Americans, and not just for a select 
few. 
The next question, then, is how to feasibly achieve 
greater diversity, especially if citizens, let alone future 
presidents, do not see the issue as a major priority.  It is 
difficult to advocate the importance of judicial diversity as 
there is no specific group directly hurt by the lack of action, 
and because there are no feasible short-term solutions.  
Furthermore, the ultimate decision is beyond the public’s 
access and control, as there is usually a multitude of 
concealed reasons for confirming or rejecting a candidate.  
The process could be modified to one that gives the public a 
greater role in the selection process, or people could demand 
that deliberations be made public, but this might too closely 
resemble an election method of selection. 
                                                 
97 Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role 
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 405, 411 (2000). 
98 Id. at 407. 
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One suggestion made in the past is to require at least 
one Democrat and Republican on each panel.99  While this 
might prevent any ideologically extreme panels from 
forming, it becomes more complicated as we learn that other 
background characteristics have a significant effect as well.  
Requiring that there be, say, at least one female or one black 
judge on every panel would be complex and controversial, but 
worth exploring.  Furthermore, the practice goes against the 
very idea that judges are not policymakers, and whose duty 
consists solely of following the law.  There are thus many 
practical questions to consider, one of which begins with the 
fact that the public is relatively unfamiliar and unconcerned 
with the lower federal courts.  It is hard to imagine a 
scenario in the near future in which people become so 
invested in the issue that a legislative act is passed to 
transform the way the U.S. Courts of Appeals currently 
operates. 
There has also been much opposition to efforts to 
broaden diversity on the courts. According to critics, 
“ideologues have their place, just not on the bench.”100  Some 
find the push for more women and racial minorities on the 
bench distasteful because they believe this affirmative action 
practice is tantamount to lowering one’s standards for 
qualified judges, falsely assuming that there are not any 
available competent female or minority judges.101  These 
political obstacles show that appointees can be easily 
rejected and that reaching a critical mass of minority judges 
in federal courts will be a long, arduous process.102 However, 
as law school populations become increasingly diverse, there 
will also be a more diverse pool of legal talent and ability 
from which to choose future judges.  These students can also 
raise awareness of the process of judicial selection at both 
state and federal levels. 
                                                 
99 Kastellec, supra note 21, at 379. 
100 Rucker, supra note 96. 
101 Id. 
102 Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule 
of Law That is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About 
Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 109 (2004). 
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Despite the disagreements over diversity on the 
judicial branch, every American should view the 
appointment of federal judges as an important process that 
affects us all, rather than a clandestine and trifling matter 
that concerns only presidents and Congress.  We can 
conclude that greater diversity can influence decisions in 
positive ways.  We can also conclude that while judges do not 
always follow the law in a completely objective manner, their 
discretion is still often restricted by the rule of law.  Thus, 
although judges should not be appointed to represent the 
interests of certain groups, they should still interpret the law 
in a way that reflects the diverse composition of our nation.  
Personal characteristics seem to make a difference on panels, 
and what we decide to do with that information is critical to 
future laws and policies.  As much as we strive for objectivity 
on the courts, we must accept that the legal system can 
never be fully removed from ideological policymaking. We 
should also understand that this reality is not necessarily an 
unfortunate one and can be used to help our nation reach the 
ideal of equal justice. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note has examined the voting behavior of judges 
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and has found that panel 
effects are present and influential in the decision-making 
process. While personal characteristics like race, gender, and 
prior prosecutorial experience do not appear to affect 
individual judicial voting, the presence of a judge with one of 
these attributes can influence the way the other two judges 
on the panel vote, which then affects the final outcome.  
Although the results do not completely match up with the 
initial hypotheses, the findings reveal something even more 
interesting about the dynamic of federal circuit courts and 
three-judge panels.  Empirical evidence cannot tell us how 
panels should be organized or what federal judges should do, 
but it has provided much insight into the way judges think. 
This Note has contributed to the current literature on 
voting behavior on federal appellate courts, particularly 
regarding panel effects, by filling in some of the holes that 
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exist from past studies’ methodologies.  Specifically, this 
Note increased the number of cases as well as the types of 
cases included in the study, and examined a greater time 
span of 77 years.  The judge attributes this Note focused on 
also went beyond party and ideology, which has been the 
focus of most key studies on judicial voting.  Prior 
prosecutorial experience has not been a characteristic of 
major interest in the past, and although both race and 
gender have been explored to some extent, this Note’s 
adjusted methodology allowed for new observations and 
conclusions about the effects of having females, racial 
minorities, and prior prosecutors on the bench.  Possible 
areas to explore in future studies include looking at judges 
on the federal district courts; elected state judges; other 
attributes such as wealth, educational background, or other 
professional experiences; and recent data that incorporates 
cases dating from 2002 until the present, especially given the 
increased diversification of the federal courts over the past 
decade.103 
In sum, this Note finds that the presence of females 
and blacks on panels generally has a strong liberal effect on 
the panel’s final decision across all cases.  However, for 
gender or race cases alone, this effect is less clear and may 
operate in the reverse direction.  There are several possible 
explanations for these mixed results, namely conformity 
effects, clear and binding law that must be followed, or 
strong convictions on certain issues that will not budge 
regardless of who else is on the same panel.  Females’ and 
blacks’ personal policy preferences are either constrained for 
the many possible reasons mentioned above, or minority 
judges may not have the inclination to vote in favor of the 
female or racial minority litigant in gender and race cases in 
the first place.  Perhaps these judges were deemed “safe,” 
conservative judicial choices and thus nominated and 
confirmed for this very reason.  In any event, this analysis 
has helped bring into light other factors that may be more 
important than personal traits when it comes to making 
decisions on the federal courts. 
                                                 
103 See McMillion, supra note 91. 
